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Abstract
We consider a signaling model of the job market in which workers, before choosing their level of
education, have the opportunity to undertake an unobservable investment in activities aimed at saving
on future education costs. Sufficiently high levels of investments allow a low productivity worker to cut
the marginal costs of signaling below the high productivity worker’s. In contrast to standard results, we
find that the equilibrium outcome will depend on the relative magnitude of workers’ average productiv-
ity. If average productivity exceeds a certain threshold the most plausible solution is a refined pooling
equilibrium in which all workers attain the same level of over-education and are paid the same wage.
Otherwise, the most plausible outcome is the standard least cost separating equilibrium in which only
high ability workers are over-educated.
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1 Introduction
Parents usually undertake costly investments in activities aimed at improving children performance
in education and working activities in adulthood. These investments may consists of effort, time
and money spent in more qualified pre-school and school activities, in extra teaching and more
generally in all those activities, which will be referred to as early education, aimed at promoting the
social and cognitive development of the child. Investments in early education are usually pursued
by parents in order to allow their children to achieve higher levels of education in adulthood and
secure better job opportunities. The aim of this paper is to examine how the private choice to invest
in early education may affect the working of job markets in which education acts as a signal of the
unobserved productive abilities of workers.
In the well-known job market signaling model put forward by Spence (1973, 1974), workers are
privately informed about their productivity and use their education choice to convey information to
the employer. If worker’s ability and education costs are negatively correlated, two key equilibrium
outcomes arise from the analysis of the model. A separating equilibrium in which high ability workers
signal themselves to the employer by attaining a higher level of education than that of low ability
workers and a pooling equilibrium where workers of high and low ability are not screened by the
employer because they obtain the same level of education. The application of standard refinements
yields as the most plausible outcome the separating equilibrium in which the high ability workers
signal their productivity with the least cost level of education and the low ability workers attain the
compulsory level.
There is empirical evidence, however, suggesting that education does not seem to be an effective
signal of worker’s productivity. For example, Clark, Jouber and Maurel (2014) show that in the
US a large fraction of workers hold occupations that do not require as much schooling as they have
acquired. Over-education is not a transitory phenomenon, possibly due to frictions in the labour
market, but it persists for a number of years and only a small fraction of overeducated workers
exit from this status. Moreover, over-educated workers earn more than less educated workers, but
earn less than similarly educated workers in occupations which require their level of schooling. The
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existing evidence seems to suggest that the operation of some sectors of the labour market is more
consistent with the outcome of a pooling equilibrium in which the level of education is above the
compulsory level rather than with the outcome of a separating one.
Although evidence is not easily reconciled with the results of the standard Spence’s model, we
think that it may nevertheless be partly explained by the analysis of a signaling model in which the
costs of education is endogenously determined by workers through non observable investments in
early education. In fact, there is some evidence that early education may have a significant impact on
the academic performance of prospective workers [see, for example, Andrews, Jargowsky and Kuhne
(2012)]. By undertaking investments in early education prospective workers will be able to lower
their future education costs so that they will have better opportunities to mimic the education level
of the most productive workers. This may explain why education seems to be seen by employers as a
weak signal of worker’s ability in a number of labour market sectors. In this paper we are interested
in understanding how the endogeneity of education costs through unobservable investments affects
the strategic interaction between workers and employers and, particularly, under what conditions
unobservable investment, which enables savings on future education costs, alters the operation of
the job market.
To address these issues we consider a simple job market signaling model where the productive
ability of a worker applying for a job is not observable by employers. Workers are privately informed
about their productivity which can be either high or low. As the low ability worker’s education costs
are higher than the high ability’s, the choice of the level of education may be used by the worker as
a signal to convey information to the employer, who makes a wage offer based on the observation
of the actual education level attained by the worker. We depart from the standard model because
we assume that the worker, before an education choice is made, has the opportunity to decide how
much to invest in activities aimed at lowering future costs of education. Moreover, we assume that
the investment decision is not observed by the employer.
The new problem arising in the context of the modified signaling model is due to the fact that the
cost advantage in acquiring education by the high ability worker over the low type, can be completely
3
eroded by investment in early eduction by the low ability worker. This makes the signaling role of
education more doubtful as high education signals can now originate more easily from low ability
workers. The question then arises as to whether or not and under what conditions the presence of
unobservable investment radically modifies the incentive of the high ability worker to convey credible
information about his productivity.
We derive conditions under which the presence of unobservable investment alters the standard
prediction of the equilibrium outcome in job market signaling models. These conditions refers to
the average productivity of workers or more generally to the distribution of productivity over the
labour force. We find that when the average productivity is sufficiently high, the most plausible
outcome is a pooling equilibrium satisfying the Divinity Criterion in which all types of worker are
over-educated. Specifically, our result is that workers will never pool at the lowest level of education,
because, as in the standard signaling model, this pooling equilibrium outcome fails to be intuitive.
On the other hand, if average productivity is relatively low, a separating outcome obtains in which
the high ability workers are required to choose a still greater level of education, as compared to the
level needed if investment were absent.
Other contributions to the literature on job market signaling have proposed models in which
refined pooling equilibria are possible. Alos-Ferrer and Prat (2012) and Daley and Green (2014)
deal with job-market signaling models in wich employers observe both costly education as well as
a noisy signal which is correlated to the worker’s productivity. In Alos-Ferrer and Prat (2012),
after the signaling stage, employers have the opportunity to update their beliefs about the worker’s
productivity based on noisy observations of the worker’s performance on the job. In Daley and
Green (2014) the noisy signal is provided by ‘grades’ or scores on a test that the employer observes
prior to making a wage offer. In both kinds of models the precision of the noisy signal reduces
the incentives for the high ability worker to signal with costly education. In these models, pooling
equilibria may turn out to be ‘stable’ because deviations to higher levels of education by the high
ability worker are less profitable than relying on the information conveyed to the employer by the
noisy signal. In the present work we deal with another kind of phenomenon and specifically the
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opportunity that a low type agent might have to cut the costs of the education signal by investing in
early education. Although our focus is on a quite different phenomenon, the results of our analysis
are somewhat related to those of Alos-Ferrer and Prat (2012) and Daley and Green (2014). In fact,
we identify conditions under which only pooling equilibria survive stability based refinements.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the signaling model introducing assumptions
and notation. The analysis of equilibria is carried out in Section 3 and further refinements are applied
in Section 4. Summary and conclusions are in Section 5. All the proofs are collected in the appendix.
2 The signaling game. Notation and assumptions
In this model of the job market workers have either high or low productive abilities. High ability
workers, or type H, have productivity πH , while workers with low ability, type L, have productivity
πL, with πH > πL > 0. Employers do not directly observe workers’ productivity. Nevertheless, they
know the prior probability that a worker has high productivity, i.e. µ = Pr(H).
Before entering the labour market, workers make a choice about the level of education to attain,
which is denoted by the real variable e ≥ 0. The worker’s level of education is observed by employers.
Education is costly both in terms of resources and utility and, to simplify matters and isolate its
signaling effect, it is assumed to have no effects on productivity. We also assume that education is
more expensive for the low ability than for the high ability worker. Specifically, marginal costs of
education are assumed to be constant and to differ across types. Marginal costs of education will
be denoted by θH and θL, respectively for type H and type L, with θL > θH > 0.
A key departure from Spence’s model is the assumption that the low ability worker has the
opportunity to undertake unobserved investments in early education, i.e. in activities aimed at
reducing the future cost of education. The investment choice is denoted by the real variable x ≥ 0
and it is not observed by employers. We assume that the L type worker’s marginal cost of education
is a strictly decreasing and convex function of investment which is denoted by θL(x), with θL(0) = θL.
To further simplify the analysis we also assume that no reduction in the marginal cost of education
can be obtained by the high ability worker. Formally, the marginal cost of education for type H is
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held fixed at θH .
1
The utility of a low ability worker is a linear function of the level of education, the amount of
investment and the labour income, denoted by w ≥ 0, and is given by
V (e, x, w) = w − x− θL(x)e. (1)
As high ability workers can not lower education costs, investment is dropped as a choice variable in
the utility function of the H type, which is simply given by
UH(e, w) = w − θHe. (2)
Labour income of a worker with no education is equal to the lowest productivity level, therefore
the reservation utility is equal to πL for both high and low ability workers.
The worker’s indifference curves at any given level of investment are represented by positively
sloped straight lines in the plane of coordinates e and w, with education measured on the horizontal
axis and wages on the vertical axis. Provided that θH < θL(x), the high ability worker’s indifference
curves are flatter than the low ability worker’s.
Based on the observation of the worker’s level of education, the employer makes a wage offer.
Competition among firms forces employers to offer the same wage at every given level of education
and firms’ profits to vanish. As productivity is not observable, firms expected profits are equal to
zero if the wage paid is equal to the worker’s expected productivity. Hence, after observing the
worker’s level of education, the employer makes an inference about the type of worker and evaluates
the worker’s expected productivity, which is given by
π(e) = (1− µ(e))πL + µ(e)πH , (3)
where µ(e) is the employer’s posterior belief that the worker has high ability upon observing the
level of education e, i.e. µ(e) = Pr(H|e).2 The wage offered by the employer is equal to π(e) and is
1This assumption could be relaxed and replaced by the assumption that the decline in marginal cost of education
due to investment is smaller for type H than for type L.





UL(e, w) = πL
UH(e, w) = πL




Figure 1: Indifference curves at reservation utility
bounded from below by πL and from above by πH .
The key element in the present signaling game, as compared to Spence’s model, is that the
cost of signaling is endogenously determined by the choice of investment and thereby the worker’s
incentive to signal must be carefully evaluated by the employer. For example, the L type may want
to invest in activities which lower the marginal cost of education because this makes mimicking the
H type cheaper and the chances of being offered a higher wage greater. The employer should realize
that a higher level of education may mean that either the worker has high ability or he is a L type
who can afford to send a high signal because he has previously invested in reducing education costs.
Therefore, in the process of forming his posterior beliefs, the employer will have to take into account
the endogeneity of signaling costs and make rational conjectures about the amount of investment
chosen by the low ability worker.
Let us then focus on rational investment behaviour by the L type’s worker. For any given level
of wage and education, the L type will choose the amount of investment which maximizes utility.
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The solution to the worker’s optimization problem is the investment function,3
x(e) = argmaxx V (e, x, w). (4)
The optimum value of utility,
UL(e, w) = w − x(e)− θL(x(e))e, (5)
is the best utility function of the low ability worker. As long as investment is chosen optimally, the low
ability worker’s payoff is given by UL(e, w). The indifference curves, when the optimal investment
decision is built into the utility function, have a concave shape and lie below the indifference curves
that would result if investment were absent. Indeed, at any given level of education the same utility
is obtained by means of a lower wage, because education costs can be conveniently lowered by a
suitable choice of investment.4
Figure 1 compares the new indifference curve at reservation utility, UL(e, w) = πL, with the
indifference curves of the two types of workers in the absence of investment, respectively V (e, 0, w) =
πL and UH(e, w) = πL. In the absence of investment the slopes are constant and are respectively
given by θL and θH . Education is always relatively more expensive for the low ability worker and
indifference curves satisfy the single crossing property. On the other hand, in the model where
investment is optimally chosen by the worker, the indifference curve of UL(e, w) changes its slope.
In particular, the effect of investment on the marginal cost of education can be strong enough that
a violation of the single crossing property may occur. In fact, it will be assumed that at sufficiently
high levels of education the marginal costs of education across types are reversed as a result of the
optimal choice of investment.
In order to specify this assumption more clearly, let us introduce some more notation. The levels
3Notice that, by linearity of V , the investment function does not depend on w for sufficiently high levels of the
wage. Investments are equal to zero at lower levels of w.
4Properties of x(e), UL(e, w) and its indifference curves are in Lemma 1 in the Appendix.
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of education e∗ and e∗∗, defined by the equations
UL(e
∗, πH) = πL (6)
UH(e
∗∗, πH) = πL, (7)
are respectively the highest education levels for type L and for type H which are consistent with
participation constraints. For higher levels of education no type of worker would enter the labour
market even if the highest market wage is paid. We will assume that the high ability worker is
willing to acquire a higher level of education than the low ability, therefore we require that e∗ < e∗∗,
as depicted in Figure 1.5
Let us consider the education wage pair (e∗, πH). As will be seen in the next section, e
∗ is
the least cost separating equilibrium level of education and πH is the equilibrium wage of the high
ability worker. We shall assume that the low ability worker’s indifference curve through the point
(e∗, πH) is flatter than the high ability worker’s. Specifically, we require that the low ability worker’s
marginal cost of education at e∗ be lower than the high ability worker’s, i.e.
θL(x(e
∗)) < θH . (8)
Condition (8) implies that the single-crossing property does not hold, because the indifference curves
of different types can cross each other twice. In particular, take both types’ indifference curves
through the point (e∗, πH) and notice that, as in Figure 2, they have another intersection at the
point of coordinates (e0, w0) formally defined as follows:
(e0, w0) 6= (e∗, πH) such that UL(e0, w0) = UL(e∗, πH) and UH(e0, w0) = UH(e∗, πH) (9)
In other words, (e0, w0) is the education-wage pair which yields to both types of workers the same
payoff as in the least cost separating equilibrium. The threshold value of the wage w0, which by (8)
exists and is well defined,6 will play an important role in the following analysis. Notice also that (8)
implies that, as depicted in Figure 2, there exists a level of education, eb, which falls within e0 and
5This is a natural assumption to make if one wants education to play a role as a signal of the worker’s ability.




UL(e, w) = πL








Figure 2: Threshold levels of education and wage
e∗, at which the marginal cost of education for the two types is the same, i.e. there exists eb such
that
θL(x(eb)) = θH . (10)
The problem described above can be formalized as a signaling game between a worker and an
employer. First, a random move of nature determines whether a worker is of type H or type L. The
worker privately learns her/his own productivity, decides how much to invest in order to reduce the
marginal costs of education and finally chooses a level of the education signal to attain. Employers
only observes the worker’s education level and make a wage offer. Finally, the worker accepts or
rejects the job and payoffs are paid. A pure strategy for the worker sets out a level of education and
an amount of investment for type L, (eL, xL), and a level of education for type H, eH . A strategy for
the employer is a function w(e) providing a wage offer for any observed level of education. Workers’
payoffs are given by (1) and (2), while the employer’s payoff is given by πt − w(e), where t = L,H.
The marginal costs of education θL(·) and θH , productivities πL and πH and the prior belief µ are
common knowledge.
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3 Signaling equilibria with unobservable investment
The solution concept we employ in the analysis of the signaling game is the Perfect Bayesian Equi-
librium.
Definition 1. A pure strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) consists of a profile of strategies
eL, xL, eH , w(e) and a system of beliefs µ(e) such that
i) Worker’s strategy is optimal, i.e.
et = argmaxe Ut(e, w(e)) with t = H,L and xL = x(eL)
ii) Employer’s strategy is optimal, i.e. w(e) = (1− µ(e))πL + µ(e)πH for all e.
iii) Beliefs and worker’s strategy are consistent with Bayes’ rule.
To cope with multiplicity, the set of equilibria is refined by restricting off equilibrium beliefs. We
apply the Intuitive Criterion amended to make allowance for endogeneity of signaling costs, hence,
following the spirit of forward induction we assume that built in the employer posterior beliefs is
the conjecture that investment is optimally chosen by the worker at all education levels on and off
the equilibrium path. By using the best utility function UL(e, w), we conveniently state the modified
version of the Intuitive Criterion employed in our analysis. Fix a PBE with strategies denoted by
eL, xL, eH , w(e). A deviation ẽ is equilibrium dominated for type L if UL(ẽ, πH) < UL(eL, w(eL)),
the equilibrium payoff of type L. A PBE survives the Intuitive Criterion if there exists no deviation
which is equilibrium dominated for the low ability worker and strictly preferred by the high ability
type.
Definition 2. A PBE with the profile of strategies eL, xL, eH and w(e) satisfies the Intuitive
Criterion if there exists no deviation ẽ such that UL(ẽ, πH) < UL(eL, w(eL)) and UH(ẽ, πH) >
UH(eH , w(eH)).
Before proceeding to the analysis of equilibrium let us briefly recall, as a benchmark, the solution




UH(e, w) = πL
UH(e, w) = UH(elc, πH)





Figure 3: The benchmark case. Separating and pooling equilibria without investment.
in the case where investment is absent, or x is held fixed at zero. Denote by elc the ‘least cost’
education level, which is defined by the condition UL(elc, 0, πH) = πL. By π̄ = µπH + (1 − µ)πL
denote the average productivity evaluated at the prior belief µ, and by ea the level of education
defined by the equation UL(ea, 0, π̄) = πL. The separating equilibrium strategies are characterized
by eL = 0, eH ≥ elc and w(e) = πL if e < elc and w(e) = πH if e ≥ elc. The worker’s pooling
strategies are eL = eH = eP with 0 ≤ eP ≤ ea, whereas w(eP ) = π̄ and w(e) = πL for e 6= eP can be
taken as the employer’s strategy. As is well know (see Cho and Kreps (1987), Cho and Sobel (1990))
only the least cost separating equilibrium, where eL = elc, survives the Intuitive Criterion. This
is the most plausible outcome of Spence’s model, which involves the high ability worker choosing
a high education level to distinguish her/himself from a low ability type and each type of worker
being paid according to her/his own productivity.
Let us turn to the analysis of equilibrium in the model with unobservable investment and,




In a separating equilibrium different types choose different levels of education, so that the employer
correctly identifies the worker’s productivity. A low type is offered the lowest wage, πL, while a high
type is given the highest wage, πH . As a low type has no incentive to invest and to choose positive
levels of education, her/his equilibrium choice is eL = 0 and xL = 0. The equilibrium education
choice of the H type, eH , must satisfy an incentive compatibility condition requiring that the low
productivity worker is better off by revealing his type and obtaining the wage πL, rather than by
mimicking the H type and receiving the wage πH , i.e.
UL(eH , πH) ≤ UL(0, πL). (11)
Moreover, the equilibrium level eH must satisfy the participation condition for type H,
UH(eH , πH) ≥ πL, (12)
requiring that the welfare of the high ability worker be greater than the reservation utility. From
the point of view of the employer, a separating equilibrium strategy may consist of the wage offer
w(e) = πL for e < eH and w(e) = πH for e ≥ eH . As can be shown, any worker’s strategy with
eL = 0, xL = 0 and with eH satisfying (11) and (12) supports a separating equilibrium. Moreover,
only one separating equilibrium surviving the Intuitive Criterion exists in which the high ability
worker acquires the ‘least cost’ education level e∗.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique separating equilibrium satisfying the Intuitive Criterion,
called the Least Cost Separating Equilibrium (LCSE), which is supported by the worker’s strategy
eL = 0, xL = 0 and eH = e
∗, where e∗ is the LCSE education level defined by (6).
Compared to the benchmark case where investment is not available, we have e∗ > elc. Here, we
notice that, as in Figure 4, a higher level of education at equilibrium is needed by the high ability
worker in order to distinguish her/himself from a low ability one. The mere fact that investment
makes mimicking cheaper for the low ability worker forces the high type to pursue an even greater




UL(e, w) = πL
UH(e, w) = UH(e
∗, πH)
UH(e, w) = UH(elc, πH)





Figure 4: Comparison between least cost separating equilibria
result, at equilibrium, the high ability worker is worse off than in the benchmark case, while the
welfare of the low ability worker remains unchanged. In Figure 4, the least cost separating equilibria
in the benchmark case (dashed lines) and in the model with investment (solid lines) are depicted.
As pointed out, the education level of the high ability worker is shifted to the right as compared to
the benchmark case. Moreover, the indifference curve at the LCSE level of education, e∗, lies below
the indifference curve at the least cost equilibrium level, elc, in the benchmark.
3.2 Pooling equilibrium
In a pooling equilibrium both types of workers choose the same level of education so that the
employer does not learn any new piece of information. At equilibrium, workers are paid the same
wage which is equal to the average productivity, π̄ = (1− µ)πL + µπH . A pooling equilibrium level
of education, denoted by eP , must satisfy the participation conditions for both types of workers,
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respectively
UL(eP , π̄) ≥ πL (13)
and
UH(eP , π̄) ≥ πL. (14)
It can be noticed that, as UL(e, w) is decreasing in education, (13) implies that education can not
exceed the level ē defined by
UL(ē, π̄) = πL. (15)
As shown in the Appendix (Lemma 2), pooling equilibria exist and are characterized by the worker’s
strategies, eL, xL, eH such that xL = x(eL), eL = eH = eP , with 0 ≤ eP ≤ ē. The employer’s
strategy can be taken as w(e) = π̄ for e ≥ eP and w(e) = πL for e < eP .
While in a standard Spence’s model no pooling equilibrium survives the Intuitive Criterion, in
this model an intuitive pooling equilibrium may exist in which both types of worker exhibit a positive
level of education. The existence condition of intuitive equilibria refers to the average productivity
of workers. In fact, one of our key results is that, as long as the average productivity exceeds the
threshold level of wage w0, defined by (9), there exists at least an intuitive pooling equilibrium.
Figure 5, which depicts a case where π̄ > w0, helps illustrate this result. The set of pooling
equilibria is associated with points lying on the solid segment delimited by A and B. Take the
pooling equilibrium associated with B and supported by the level of education ē. Any deviation
ẽ which lies below the education level e′ is preferred by both types and any deviation above e∗ is
equilibrium dominated for all types of worker. Moreover, any deviation in the interval (e′, e∗) is
equilibrium dominated for the H type and strictly preferred by the L type. As a result, if the low
ability worker deviated by choosing a level of education in this interval, he would reveal his type to
the employer who will accordingly offer a low wage to the worker. Hence, we conclude that all the
deviations pass the Intuitive Criterion test and the education level ē supports an intuitive pooling
equilibrium. It may also be noticed that at such an equilibrium the L type is not worse off whereas




UL(e, w) = πL
UL(e, w) = UL(0, π̄)













UH(e, w) = UH(0, π̄)
Figure 5: Intuitive pooling equilibrium
Interestingly, the pooling equilibrium associated with point A in Figure 5 and supported by a
zero level of education (with w = π̄) is easily seen to be non intuitive. In fact, the deviation ẽ = e′′
associated with point C is strictly preferred by H and it is equilibrium dominated for type L. Hence,
a pooling equilibrium supported by no education can not be intuitive. In fact, it will be shown that
intuitive pooling equilibria can only be supported by strictly positive education levels.
It can also be shown that no pooling equilibrium satisfying the Intuitive Criterion exists if the
average productivity lies below the threshold level of wage, w0. This result can be easily seen from
Figure 6, which depicts a case where π̄ < w0. Indeed, no pooling equilibrium supported by a level
of education between e′ and ē can satisfy the Intuitive Criterion, because a deviation in the interval
]e
′′′
, e′′[ is easily found which is strictly dominated for L and strictly preferred by the H type of
worker. Next, take the pooling equilibrium associated with point A′ and supported by the level of
education e′. It is straightforward to see that any deviation ẽ in the interval ]e′′′, e∗[ is equilibrium




UL(e, w) = πL
UL(e, w) = UL(e
′, π̄)












Figure 6: No intuitive pooling equilibria
the Intuitive Criterion. The same argument allows us to discard all pooling equilibria supported by
education levels lying to the left of e′. This graphical analysis agrees with the conclusion that no
intuitive pooling equilibrium exists if the average productivity of labour is relatively low.
In order to provide a formal characterization of the set of intuitive pooling equilibria let us
introduce a few definitions. For any education-wage pair (e, w) with w ∈ [πL, πH ] consider the
highest profitable deviation for type t, as the function δt(e, w) = δt implicitly defined by the condition
Ut(δt, πH) = Ut(e, w), with t = H,L.
7 In other words, these functions provide the maximal education
level which makes a worker’s type who earns the highest wage indifferent to the given education-wage
pair. Notice that δH(0, πL) = e
∗∗ and, by (9), δH(e0, w0) = e
∗. Moreover, at all wage-education
pairs along the indifference curve of the low ability worker at the reservation utility the function
δL(e, w) is constant and specifically δL(0, πL) = δL(e0, w0) = e
∗.
7Given our assumptions on utility we have δH(e, w) = e + (πH − w)/θH , while the function δL(e, w) is implicitly
defined as the solution to πH − w − x(δL) + x(e)− θL(x(δL))δL + θL(x(e))e = 0.
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Next, let us define the profitable deviation gap as the function
g(e, w) = δH(e, w)− δL(e, w)
This construction is used to identify intuitive equilibria. If the profitable deviation gap is positive
at the equilibrium supported by the education-wage pair (e, w), i.e. if g(e, w) > 0, then δH(e, w) >
δL(e, w) and there exists a deviation ẽ with
δL(e, w) < ẽ < δH(e, w)
which is strictly preferred by the high ability worker and equilibrium dominated by the low ability.
As a result, the given equilibrium does not satisfy the Intuitive Criterion, according to Definition 2.
By contrast, if g(e, w) ≤ 0 then the given equilibrium passes the Intuitive Criterion test.
As will be seen, if workers’ average productivity is greater than the wage threshold w0, then
there exists a minimum education level which makes the profitable deviation gap function to vanish
at wage w = π̄, i.e. there exists e such that
g(e, π̄) = 0 (16)
This level of education is the lowest level of education consistent with an intuitive pooling equilibrium
and can be seen to lie between e0 and eb.
The main results of this section are summarized in the following
Proposition 2. Let w0, e0 , ē and e be as respectively defined by (9), (15) and (16).
i) If π̄ < w0, no pooling equilibrium exists that satisfy the Intuitive Criterion.
ii) If π̄ ≥ w0, there exist pooling equilibria satisfying the Intuitive Criterion and, specifically, any
level of education in the interval [e, ē] supports an intuitive pooling equilibrium. The minimum
value of education e lies in the interval ]e0, eb[. The intuitive pooling equilibrium with eP = e
is called the Least Cost Pooling Equilibrium (LCPE).
The above results can also be illustrated by means of a simple numerical example. Suppose that
θL = 1, θH = 1/4, πL = 1, πH = 4 and θL(x) = exp(−x). The low ability worker best utility
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function is UL(e, w) = w − e if e ≤ 1 and UL(e, w) = w − 1 − ln(e) if e > 1. The LCSE level of
education is e∗ = 7.39, while the threshold values of e and w are e0 = 1.85 and w0 = 2.62. If the high
ability workers are relatively more numerous, for example µ = 2/3, then the average productivity is
π̄ = 3 > w0 and we have e = 2.33 and ē = 2.72. Thus, the LCPE is supported by a level of education
equal to 2.33, while the LCSE requires the high ability worker to obtain a level of education equal
to 7.39.
4 Equilibrium selection
In order to arrive at a sharper prediction about the outcome of the game, a further selection of the
set of intuitive equilibria can be accomplished by applying a slightly more stringent requirement on
off equilibrium beliefs which is called the Divinity Criterion and was first introduced by Banks and
Sobel (1987) (see also Cho and Kreps, 1987). Let us introduce the Divinity Criterion with the help
of some additional notation.
For any given level of education e an employer’s best response to e is a wage offer which belongs
to the closed interval delimited by worker’s productivities, i.e. w ∈ [πL, πH ], and depends on the
employer’s beliefs about types. Let us fix a PBE and denote type t worker’s equilibrium payoff by
U∗t . If an education level ẽ is not on the equilibrium path, the set of employer’s best responses to ẽ
that cause type t to defect from the equilibrium strategy is given by
D(t | ẽ) = {w ∈ [πL, πH ] | U∗t < Ut(ẽ, w)} . (17)
By D0(t | ẽ) we denote the set of employer’s best responses to ẽ which yield to type t exactly the
same utility as in equilibrium.
If the set D0(t | ẽ)∪D(t | ẽ) is not empty, type t has a preference to deviate from the equilibrium
strategy if this deviation is met with some best response from the employer. If the above set is empty
but there exists a type t′ 6= t such that D(t′ | ẽ) 6= ∅, then following ẽ the employer should have
beliefs which place probability zero on type t as required by the Intuitive Criterion. Indeed, if t = L




UL(e, w) = πL












Figure 7: LCSE and the Divinity Criterion
and it must hold µ(ẽ) = 1. The Divinity Criterion adds to the Intuitive Criterion a slightly more
stringent requirement which applies when both types of worker have an incentive to deviate.
Definition 3. (Divinity Criterion) Let ẽ be a deviation from a PBE. If both sets D0(t | ẽ)∪D(t | ẽ)
and D(t′ | ẽ) are not empty and D0(t | ẽ) ∪D(t | ẽ) ⊂ D(t′ | ẽ), then µ(ẽ) ≥ µ, if t = L and t′ = H,
and µ(ẽ) ≤ µ, if t = H and t′ = L. Moreover, if D0(t | ẽ) ∪ D(t | ẽ) = ∅ and D(t′ | ẽ) 6= ∅, then
µ(ẽ) = 1, if t = L and t′ = H, and µ(ẽ) = 0, if t = H and t′ = L.
Beside the restrictions imposed by the Intuitive Criterion, Divinity requires that if type t′ has
‘more opportunities’ to deviate than type t, the employer’s beliefs following the deviation should be
updated by increasing the prior probability of type t′.
Let us now apply the Divinity Criterion to refine the set of intuitive equilibria. Our main result
is that if the workers’ average productivity is relatively low, the predicted outcome is the LCSE
characterized in Proposition 1. By contrast, if the average productivity is sufficiently large the
predicted outcome is the LCPE characterized in Proposition 2.
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Proposition 3. Let w0, e, ē and eb be as respectively defined by (9), (16), (15) and (10).
i) If π̄ < w0 the LCSE is the unique equilibrium satisfying the Divinity Criterion.
ii) If π̄ > w0 only pooling equilibria survive the Divinity Criterion. Specifically, divine pooling
equilibria are supported by education levels in the interval [e, ē] if w0 < π̄ < wb and by education
levels [e, eb] if π̄ > wb, where wb is determined by UL(eb, wb) = πL.
A formal proof of Proposition 3 is found in the Appendix. Figure 7 provides an illustration of why
the LCSE fails to pass the Divinity Criterion test when workers’ average productivity is relatively
high. In fact, take the deviation ẽ from the equilibrium level of education e∗. It is easily seen that
D0(L | ẽ) ∪D(L | ẽ) = [π̄, πH ] and D(H | ẽ) =]w′, πH ]. Since D0(L | ẽ) ∪D(L | ẽ) ⊂ D(H | ẽ) and
the sets are not empty, the Divinity Criterion requires the beliefs to be µ(ẽ) ≥ µ and consequently
the wage offer w(ẽ) ≥ π̄. The point D in Figure 7 lies above the indifference curve of the high ability
worker so that the equilibrium choice of e∗ is not any more optimal for the high ability worker,
which means that the LCSE can not be supported by beliefs satisfying the Divinity Criterion.
Divinity rules out pooling equilibria supported by levels of education in excess of eb, the level
which triggers investments in early education large enough to equalize the marginal costs of education
of both types. The intuition for this result is that for eP > eb the marginal cost of education of
the low ability is lower than that of the high ability worker so that a deviation to a lower education
signal is more profitable for the H type. As a result, the employer’s belief can not put less weight
than that at the prior on the worker being of high type. This in turn means that the wage offer can
not fall below the average productivity, but this makes the deviation to a lover level of education
more profitable than the equilibrium choice.
According to Proposition 3, there still remains a multiplicity of equilibria when workers’ average
productivity is relatively high. However, among all the pooling equilibria satisfying the Divinity
Criterion the LCPE defined in Proposition 2 is Pareto undominated, as it involves the lowest level
of education, and thereby can be singled-out as the most plausible solution.
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5 Conclusions
In a labour market in which the average productivity is relatively low, the most plausible outcome is
a separating equilibrium where highly productive workers are overeducated and all workers are paid
according to their productivity. By contrast, if the average productivity is relatively high, the most
plausible outcome is a pooling equilibrium where both types of workers are overeducated and are
paid a wage equal to the average productivity. Both types of workers are better off than they would
be if education revealed worker’s productivity to the employer, although all workers are forced to
achieve extra education. This last result seems quite consistent with empirical evidence. In fact, it
is not uncommon to see workers holding occupations that do not require as much schooling as they
have acquired and this does not seem to be a temporary or transitory phenomenon, as the bulk
of overeducated workers is seen to persists after many years. Moreover, overeducated workers tend
to earn more than less educated workers, but tend to earn less than equally educated workers in
occupations requiring their level of schooling.
An intuitive explanation of our findings and in particular of the result that the pooling solution
requires a strictly positive level of education can be given as follows. Investment in early education,
which reduces the future cost of schooling, makes mimicking of the high type cheaper for the low
ability worker. In order to separate from a low type, a high ability worker is forced to send an even
higher education signal at a separating equilibrium, which in turn implies that the H type worker
will incur in higher costs of education and will be worse off. This makes pooling equilibria even more
appealing to the H type especially when the average productivity and the employer’s wage offers are
relatively high. However, a pooling equilibrium can be a plausible solution provided that it survives
stability based refinements, i.e. if there are no other education signals that can make the H type
better off and the low type worse off. In other words, a pooling outcome can be a plausible solution
only if whenever a deviation is profitable for the high ability worker it also results profitable for the
low ability. This will occur if, at equilibrium, the investment in early education by the low ability
worker is high enough to annihilate the advantage in marginal costs of the high ability over the low
ability worker. This can not happen in a pooling equilibrium where both worker’s types acquire zero
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education. In fact, as a low ability worker will not invest, the gap in the marginal cost of education
between types will remain large, so that the high ability worker will profitably use the education
signal to induce the employer to offer a higher wage. For this reason, a pooling equilibrium with
zero education can not be a stable equilibrium and should not be considered as a plausible solution.
A few empirical implications stem from this analysis. In the first place our findings are not
consistent with the observation of a pooling equilibrium where workers have zero (the compulsory
level of) education and earn an average wage. According to our results average wages can only be
observed in association with positive levels of education, i.e. our results seem to be quite consistent
with the phenomenon of over-education.
Secondly, our analysis implies that the marginal cost of education of low and high ability workers
should be quite similar at equilibrium. Although marginal costs are not directly observable, their
difference might have observable implications that could be tested. For example, low ability workers
who invested in early education should have similar skills as high ability workers as to their school
performance. As a result, it could be tested whether workers with the same average education and
the same average wages exhibit similar test scores or transcripts.
Another implication of our analysis is that in economic sectors or geographical regions where
for various reasons the average productivity of workers is relatively low, the education-wage pattern
that should be observed is similar to that resulting from a separating equilibrium, i.e. low wage
and low education on one side and high wage and high education on the other. The same type of
patterns should also be observed in contexts where a large majority of households are financially
constrained and can not invest in early education. In such a case the conclusions of Spence’s model
should apply.
In contrast, in more affluent socio economic contexts where parents have higher average level
of schooling, investment in the early education of children is not constrained and the results of our
analysis should be more appropriate.
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Appendix
Let us first establish the main properties of investment and best utility functions.
Lemma 1. Let x(e) and UL(e, w) be as respectively defined by (4) and (5), and ec = −1/θ′L(0).
The following properties hold:
(i) The investment function x(e) is well defined with x(e) = 0 for 0 ≤ e ≤ ec and it is strictly
increasing for e > ec.




(iii) The indifference curve of UL(e, w) at the utility level u, wL(e) = u+x(e)+θL(x(e))e, is strictly
increasing with slope given by θL(x(e)) and it is strictly concave for e ≥ ec.
(iv) Let e∗ be as defined by (6). There exists a unique education level eb ∈]ec, e∗[ such that
θL(x(eb)) = θH .
(v) There exists a unique pair of values (e0, w0) 6= (e∗, πH) satisfying (9), i.e. such that
UL(e0, w0) = UL(e
∗, πH)
UH(e0, w0) = UH(e
∗, πH).
Moreover, e0 < eb.
Proof of Lemma 1.
(i) As V (e, x, w) depends linearly and negatively on x, an optimal level of investment must be
bounded from above. Thus we can restrict the analysis of the best value of x to a compact interval
with 0 as the left end point. By continuity of V a solution to the maximization problem (4) exists.
Moreover, as θL(x) is strictly decreasing and convex the solution is unique and x(e) is a well defined
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function.8 Next, notice that as V (e, x, w) is strictly concave in x, the first order condition are
necessary and sufficient for a maximum and x = 0 satisfies the FOC for any 0 ≤ e < ec.
In order to show that x(e) is strictly increasing, let e′ and e′′ be such that e′′ > e′ > ec and
denote respectively by x′ and x′′ the optimal levels of investment. From the conditions V (e′, x′, w) >





(e′′ − e′) > 0
which means θL(x
′) > θL(x
′′), which in turns implies x′ < x′′ as θL(·) is strictly decreasing.




∂V (e, x, w)
∂e
|x=x(e)= −θL(x(e)) < 0.
(iii) By the Implicit Function Theorem, the slope of the indifference curve of UL(e, w) is given by
−∂UL(e, w)
∂e
= θL(x(e)) > 0
where we used the result in Lemma 1.(ii). Hence, indifference curves are strictly increasing and their
second derivative is given by
θ′L(x(e))x
′(e) ≤ 0
which, by Lemma 1.(i), is equal to zero if 0 ≤ e ≤ ec and it is strictly negative for e > ec.
(iv) By (8) we have
θL(x(e
∗)) < θH < θL = θL(x(ec))
and ec < e
∗, since θL(x(e)) is strictly decreasing by Lemma 1.(ii). As θL(x(e)) is the derivative
of type L ’s indifference curve, Darboux Theorem implies that there exists eb ∈]ec, e∗[ such that
θL(x(eb)) = θH . Moreover, by strict monotonicity of θL(·), eb is unique.
8Arguing by contradiction to prove uniqueness, let x′ and x′′ 6= x′ be two solutions so that V (e, x′, w) = V (e, x′′, w).
By strict convexity of θL(·), θL(x̂) < (1/2(θL(x′) + θL(x′′)), where x̂ = (x′ + x′′)/2. Hence w − x̂ − θL(x̂)e >
(1/2)(w − x′ − θL(x′)e+ w − x′′ − θL(x′′)e) implying V (e, x̂, w) > V (e, x′, w), which is impossible.
25
(v) Take the indifference curves of the two types passing through the point (e∗, πH), respectively
wL(e) = πL + x(e) + θL(x(e))e (18)
wH(e) = (πH − θHe∗) + θHe (19)
and define the function
f(e) = wL(e)− wH(e) = πL − πH + θHe∗ + x(e) + (θL(x(e))− θH)e
We have to show that f(e) vanishes for some e ∈]0, e∗[. By construction, f(e∗) = 0. Moreover, as
f ′(e∗) = θL(x(e
∗))−θH < 0 by (8), a standard argument shows that for e′ < e∗ and sufficiently close
to e∗ it holds f(e′) > 0. As f(0) = πL − πH + θHe∗ < 0, by the assumption9 e∗ < e∗∗, continuity of
f implies that there exists e0 ∈]0, e′[ such that f(e0) = 0. It can also be shown that e0 is unique,
i.e. f does not vanish anywhere else. Now let w0 = wL(e0) = wH(e0), then from (18) we obtain
UL(e0, w0) = UL(e
∗, πH) and from (19), w0 − θHe0 = πH − θHe∗ or UH(e0, w0) = UH(e∗, πH).
Finally, as θL(x(e)) is strictly decreasing and θL(x(e0)) > θH = θL(x(eb)) we have e0 < eb.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 2. The worker’s strategy (eL, xL), eH with eL = eH = eP supports a pooling equilibrium
if and only if it satisfies (13), (14) and xL = x(eL).
Proof of Lemma 2.
Let the worker’s strategy satisfy (13), (14) and xL = x(eL) and take the beliefs µ(e) = µ if e > eP
and µ(e) = 0 otherwise. Accordingly, take the wage offer w(e) = π̄ if e > eP and w(e) = πL if e < eP .
Hence, w(e) and µ(e) satisfy Definition 1.(ii). Next, as UL is decreasing in e, UL(eP , π̄) > UL(e, π̄) for
e ≥ eP and UL(eP , π̄) > UL(e, πL) for e < eP , because by (13), UL(eP , π̄) ≥ UL(0, πL) > UL(e, πL).
Therefore eP is an optimal choice for type L given w(e) and so is the choice of x since xL = x(eL).
Similarly, for type H, UH(eP , π̄) > UH(e, π̄) for e > eP , because UH is decreasing in e. Moreover,
for e < eP we have UH(e, πL) < UH(0, πL) = πL ≤ UH(eP , π̄) by (14). Thus, also the choice of type
H is optimal. Finally, it is easily seen that the worker’s strategy and beliefs obey the Bayes’s rule.
9Note that the assumption e∗ < e∗∗ can be stated as e∗ < (πH − πL)/θH .
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The converse is easily seen to hold.
Q.E.D.
Let us see a few important properties of the profitable deviation gap function. Recall that
for all education-wage pairs along the indifference curve of type L at reservation utility, we have










for all (e, w) such that UL(e, w) = πL. Moreover, g(0, πL) = e
∗∗−e∗ > 0 by the assumption e∗ < e∗∗,
and g(e0, w0) = 0 by (9).
Lemma 3. Let w0, e0 and eb as respectively defined by (9) and (10).
i) The function g(e, w) is decreasing in e; moreover g(e, w) is increasing in w if δL > eb where
δL = δL(e, w).
ii) Let (e, w) be such that UL(e, w) = πL; then g(e, w) > 0 iff w < w0 (which in turn implies
g(e, w) < 0 iff w0 < w < πH).
iii) g(e0, w) > 0 for all w0 < w < πH ; moreover, g(eb, w) < 0 for all wb < w < πH , where wb is
such that UL(eb, wb) = πL.
Proof of Lemma 3.
(i) The derivative of g(e, w) with respect to e for any given w ∈ (πL, πH) is given by
∂g(e, w)
∂e
= 1− ∂δL(e, w)
∂e
In order to compute the derivative of δL(e, w) w.r.t. e, apply the Implicit Function Theorem to the

















and the function g is strictly decreasing in e.































which is positive if δL > eb where δL = δL(e, w).
(ii) Let us first show that w < w0 implies g(e, w) > 0. Let wL(e) be the indifference curve implicitly
defined by UL(e, w) = πL. Given w1 < w0, let e1 be determined by w1 = wL(e1), so that, by
monotonicity of wL(·), e1 < e0. Consider
g(e1, w1) = g(e1, w1)− g(e0, w0) =
wL(e0)− wL(e1)
θH
− (e0 − e1) (20)
By the Mean Value Theorem, there exists ξ ∈]e1, e0[ such that
w(e0)− w(e1) = w′(ξ)(e0 − e1) (21)
By strict concavity of wL(·), the derivative w′L(·) is strictly decreasing so that w′L(e1) < w′L(ξ) <
w′L(e0) and since by Lemma 1, w
′
L(e) = θL(x(e)), we have
θL(x(ξ) > θH . (22)
From (21) and (22) we obtain wL(e0)− wL(e1) > θH(e0 − e1) and finally
wL(e0)− wL(e1)
θH
− (e0 − e1) > 0. (23)
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Hence, (20) and (23) yield g(e1, w1) > 0 and the first part of the proof is complete.
Let us show that g(e, w) > 0 implies w < w0. In negation to this suppose that g(e1, w1) > 0 but
w1 > w0, where e1(> e0) is defined by w1 = wL(e1).
10 By using concavity of wL(·) (Lemma 1) it




Hence, rearranging terms we get
wL(e0)− wL(e1)
θH
− (e0 − e1) < 0
which, by (20), yields the contradiction g(e1, w1) < 0, which establishes the result.
(iii) Take w′ ∈]w0, πH [ and consider the indifference curve of the low ability worker passing through
the education-wage pair (e0, w
′), i.e. the function w = w̃L(e) implicitly defined by the equation
UL(e, w) = UL(e0, w
′). As can be easily checked, the indifference curve also passes through the pair
(e∗, πH+(w
′−w0). It can also be checked that the indifference curve of the high type worker through
the education-wage pair (e0, w
′), i.e. w = w′+θH(e−e0), passes through the point (e∗, πH+(w′−w0).
Let us take δ′H = δH(e0, w
′) which is known to lie between e0 and e
∗. By concavity of w̃L(e), it is
easily seen that w̃L(δ
′
H) > πH . Moreover, by definition, δ
′
L = δL(e0, w
′) is given by the equation
πH = w̃L(δ
′




L). Since w̃L(e) is increasing
it follows that δ′H > δ
′
L so that g(e0, w
′) = δ′H − δ′L > 0.
Let us turn to the second point and let ŵL(e) be the indifference curve of the low ability worker
passing through the point (eb, w
′). By definition, the slope of the indifference curve at eb is equal to
the slope of the indifference curve of the high type, i.e. d ŵL(eb)/d e = θH . Therefore, by concavity,
the graph of ŵL(e) lies below the indifference curve of the high type passing through (eb, w
′). The
high type ’s indifference curve also crosses the point (δ′H , πH) where δ
′
H = δH(eb, w
′), so that by
concavity of ŵL(e) we have ŵL(δ
′
H) < πH . Noting that ŵL(δ
′









L, so that g(eb, w
′) = δ′H − δ′L < 0 and this completes the
proof.
10The case w1 = w0 leads immediately to a contradiction given strict monotonicity of wL(·).
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Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Notice first, that by using Lemma 2, it is easily seen that the education level ē defined by the
equation UL(ē, π̄) = πL supports a pooling equilibrium at wage w = π̄. Moreover, any level of
education between 0 and ē supports a pooling equilibrium.
(i) Let π̄ < w0. By Lemma 3.(ii) we have g(ē, π̄) > 0; moreover, as g is decreasing in e (Lemma
3.(i)) we have g(e, π̄) > 0 for all e ∈ [0, ē]. Therefore, for any education level eP ∈ [0, ē] supporting a
pooling equilibrium, it must hold g(eP , π̄) > 0, i.e. δH(eP , π̄) > δL(eP , π̄), so that a deviation ẽ such
that δL(eP , π̄) < ẽ < δH(eP , π̄) exists which violates the conditions in Definition 2 for an intuitive
equilibrium. Therefore, there is no intuitive pooling equilibrium if π < w0.
(ii) Let π̄ > w0. By Lemma 3.(ii) and 3.(iii), g(ē, π̄) < 0 and g(e0, π̄) > 0. Given continuity and
monotonicity of g in e, there exists and is unique the level of education e defined by (16) with
e0 < e < ē. Noting that g(e, π̄) < 0 for all e ∈]e, ē], it is easily seen that any pooling equilibrium
supported by an education level in this interval survives the Intuitive Criterion.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.
(i) By Proposition 2, there are no intuitive pooling equilibria, therefore only the LCSE could satisfy
the Divinity Criterion when π̄ < w0. Let us take the following beliefs: µ(e) = 1 if e ≥ e∗, µ(e) = µ
if e0 ≤ e < e∗ and µ(e) = 0 if e < e0. These beliefs are easily seen to support the LCSE strategy.
We will show now that they obey the Divinity Criterion. Consider the deviation e0 ≤ ẽ < e∗ and
notice that the indifference curves of both types of worker cross at e0 and at e
∗. By applying (17),
we have D0(L | ẽ) ∪ D(L | ẽ) = [wL(ẽ), πH ] and D(H | ẽ) =]wH(ẽ), πH ], where wL(e) and wH(e)
denote the indifference curves of the two types of worker. By concavity of the low ability worker
indifference curve we have wL(ẽ) > wH(ẽ); therefore, D
0(L | ẽ)∪D(L | ẽ) ⊂ D(H | ẽ) and Definition
3 requires µ(ẽ) ≥ µ, which is satisfied by the above beliefs. Now take ẽ < e0. By concavity of the
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indifference curves of the L type, we have wL(ẽ) < wH(ẽ) so that D
0(H | ẽ) ∪D(H | ẽ) ⊂ D(L | ẽ)
and Definition 3 requires µ(ẽ) ≤ µ, which is satisfied by the above beliefs. Hence the LCSE passes
the Divinity criterion test.
(ii) Let us first show that if π̄ > w0 then the LCSE fails the Divinity Criterion. Consider the deviation
ẽ = ē, where ē is given by UL(ē, π̄) = πL. As we know, e0 < ē < e
∗. By concavity of the L type
indifference curve, π̄ > w′, where UH(ẽ, w
′) = UH(e
∗, πH). As a result, D
0(L | ẽ)∪D(L | ẽ) = [π̄, πH ]
and D(H | ẽ) =]w′, πH ]. Since D0(L | ẽ)∪D(L | ẽ) ⊂ D(H | ẽ) and the sets are not empty, Definition
3 requires that µ(ẽ) ≥ µ and consequently the wage offered by the employer must be w(ẽ) ≥ π̄. Since
UH(e
∗, πH) = UH(ē, w
′) < UH(ē, π̄), we conclude that the separating equilibrium level of education
e∗ is not an optimal choice for the high ability worker if beliefs obey the Divinity Criterion. Hence,
the LCSE can not be supported by beliefs satisfying the Divinity Criterion.
Let us turn to pooling equilibria. When w0 < π̄ < wb, the set of intuitive pooling equilibria is
supported by e ∈ [e, ē] as stated in Proposition 2.(ii). It can be shown, by using similar arguments
to those in (i), that for any eP ∈ [e, ē], the beliefs µ(ẽ) = µ if ẽ > eP and µ(ẽ) = 0 if ẽ < eP support
the pooling equilibrium and satisfy the Divinity Criterion.
Next, suppose that π̄ > wb and take a pooling equilibrium supported by eP ∈]eb, ē]. Consider
the deviation ẽ ∈]eb, eP [. The Divinity Criterion requires that µ(ẽ) ≥ µ, so that the wage offer is
w(e) ≥ µ, which makes this deviation more profitable than the equilibrium choice eP . Thus, no
pooling equilibrium supported by eP > eb can survive the Divinity Criterion.
Q.E.D.
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